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Financial vulnerability and seeking expert advice: Evidence 





The role of a bank advisor is especially important for guiding and counseling financially distressed 
individuals. Using a randomized controlled survey experiment conducted on a representative 
sample of French individuals and priming the financial vulnerability of half the respondents, we 
examine attitudes toward bank advisors. We find that priming deters low-income individuals from 
showing an extremely negative attitude toward seeking banking advice (positive effect); it also 
deters them from showing an extremely positive attitude (negative effect). We also find that acute 
financial distress partially drives the positive effect, and a lack of financial literacy partially drives 
the negative effect. 
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Professional financial advice can have profound effects on poor individuals who may be less 
financially literate and more vulnerable to financial distress. For debt counseling, advice on budget 
management, or advice on saving, bank advisors can be the most effective. In addition, for 
financially vulnerable individuals, asking for help from a bank can have substantial economic 
benefits (e.g., debt management, penalty and fee reductions, access to budgeting tools, interest 
from savings accounts, etc.). However, a recurrent point of concern for policymakers and corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) managers is that poor individuals, despite their financial vulnerability, 
are less inclined to use relevant products and seek advice from banks (Bertrand et al., 2004, 2006).1  
Our study uses a behavioral perspective to make causal claims on the relation between 
financial vulnerability and seeking expert advice. We assume that, for the poor, contextual factors 
linked to economic conditions also matter in the decision to consult with a financial advisor. 
Importantly, we study banking advice, which is almost freely available to all and covers a broader 
spectrum of advice and services that better suit those most in need (the financially vulnerable).  
To this end, our empirical analysis examines how a shock to individual financial situations 
affects attitudes among low-income individuals toward seeking advice from a bank advisor, which 
we define as the subjective appreciation that advice from a bank advisor (in the broad sense of the 
term advice) can be beneficial and an emotionally comfortable experience. Financial vulnerability 
is at the forefront for many low-income individuals; presumably it is a less threatening thought (or 
even a thought of financial security) for rich individuals. We define “poor” as individuals or 
                                                          
1 A report on financial inclusion in France by the Banque de France alerts on the fact that in 2018, only 11% of the 
estimated 3.4 million fragile clients benefited from a special offer proposed by the bank (i.e., Offre Client Fragile). 
The CSR manager from a major French bank reported that eligible clients tend to “never show up at bank branches” 
despite the help they could find there.  
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households living below the poverty line defined by the French National Institute for Statistics and 
Economic Studies (INSEE). 
Our objective is to understand whether finance-related concerns could improve or 
deteriorate the willingness among the poor to seek professional financial advice from bank 
advisors. On one hand, the literature analyzing poverty from a behavioral economics/finance 
perspective assumes that poorer individuals anticipate feeling stigmatized in the banking 
environment, which they perceive as hostile and not intended for people with low financial 
resources or lacking financial literacy (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2004; 2006; Mullainathan and Shafir, 
2013). Thus, we might expect that increasing financial vulnerability exacerbates negative 
anticipatory feelings linked to stigmas of poverty and negatively affects the attitudes of poor 
individuals toward bank advisors.  
On the other hand, research in behavioral economics/finance suggests that individuals tend 
to have selective attention, placing a cognitive distance between themselves and their own 
financial difficulties (e.g., Olafsson et al., 2018; Olafsson and Pagel, 2017; Sicherman et al., 2016; 
Stango and Zinman, 2014). Thus, exacerbating the salience of financial issues leads individuals to 
take action on their issues (e.g., Stango and Zinman, 2014). Consistent with this, we might assume 
that priming finance-related concerns is a way to focus attention on underlying issues and 
potentially trigger a solution-seeking attitude to consult with a financial advisor. 
Empirically addressing which of these two opposing hypotheses prevails is important to 
understand how poverty-related situations affect individual attitudes toward seeking advice from 
bank advisors. Importantly, showing that poverty affects attitudes about seeking banking advice 
could be of a great help for policymakers or bank CSR managers who want better awareness 
campaigns that increase the use of banking solutions among poor, vulnerable clients. From a 
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societal viewpoint, understanding the role of poverty as a driver in seeking banking advice can 
lead to financial policies that improve individuals’ financial condition and social cohesion. 
Our empirical approach is to conduct a randomized controlled survey experiment (e.g., 
Delis et al., 2021; Alesina et al., 2018; Beaman and Dillon, 2012; Karadja et al., 2017; Kuziemko 
et al., 2015; Mullinix et al., 2015; Mutz 2011) using individuals representative of the French 
population. The treatment is to increase the salience of individuals’ finance-related concerns via 
priming half the respondents. Specifically, we ask primed individuals questions about their 
financial situations before asking five Likert-scale questions addressing their perceptions about 
consulting with a bank advisor. In contrast, members of the control group answer questions on 
their financial situations after reporting their perceptions of consulting with a bank advisor. Thus, 
our baseline model compares attitudes toward bank advisors for treated and control groups at 
different income levels that measure for poverty (Mani et al. 2013).  
Mental priming is a widely used technique in experimental protocols in economics and 
finance to explore the behavioral influence of concerns linked to a social identity or economic 
condition (Afridi et al., 2015; Carr and Steele, 2010; Ke 2017; Kray et al., 2001; Lee et al., 2011; 
Liu et al., 2012; Mani et al., 2013; for a review see Cohn and Maréchal, 2016). Previous studies 
use priming to put poverty-related concerns at the forefront of individuals’ minds. They show that 
such priming affects present biased preferences (Bartoš et al. 2021; Liu et al., 2012), general 
cognition (Mani et al., 2013), and financial cognition (Delis et al., 2021). Our priming technique 
also relates to the natural experiment in Stango and Zinman (2014), who exploit cross-sectional 
differences in whether survey participants answer overdraft-related questions. Those who did so 
subsequently improved their overdraft situations.  
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A survey of French individuals is particularly appropriate given that France has a very high 
rate of banking inclusion, with 99% of individuals having a bank account.2 Further, as soon as 
someone opens a bank account in France, the bank makes the accountholder aware that he or she 
can consult for free with an assigned advisor.3 
Early results from our empirical analysis show that priming does not significantly affect 
respondents’ attitudes toward bank advisors, neither among relatively poor respondents nor among 
relatively rich ones. However, a refined analysis shows that as poverty increases, priming makes 
individuals less likely to report extreme attitudes in that matter. There is a positive effect, whereby 
the primed poor are less likely to report extremely negative attitudes toward bank advisors, 
compared to nonprimed poor and rich individuals (primed and nonprimed). There is also a negative 
effect, whereby the primed poor are less likely to report extremely positive attitudes toward bank 
advisors compared to nonprimed poor and rich individuals.  
Seeking expert advice is undoubtedly linked to experiencing severe financial distress in the 
form of overindebtedness, default on financial obligations, and/or a lack of financial literacy, with 
these elements being more pronounced among the poor. We thus further examine whether these 
identified positive and negative effects change for equivalent effects of priming when financial 
literacy is relatively low or financial situations are relatively difficult. 
We find, on one hand, that the positive effect of priming on the attitude toward banking 
advice among relatively poor respondents is partially due to a similar positive effect priming has 
on attitudes among individuals with more financial distress. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that focusing on individuals’ actual issues can improve vulnerable individuals’ attitudes toward 
                                                          
2 According to a 2013 study by the French Banks Federation (Fédération des Banques Française, FBF). 
3 In the past decades, laws on consumer protection have been reinforced to increase banks’ obligation to help the most 
fragile customers who can benefit from more specific banking services and fee waivers (e.g., Article R312-4-3 du 
Code monétaire et financier, 2014). 
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seeking advice from a bank advisor. On the other hand, we find that the negative effect of priming 
on the attitude toward banking advice among relatively poor respondents is partially due to a 
similar negative effect of priming among less financially literate individuals. This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that the salience of financial vulnerability exacerbates anticipatory fears about 
feeling stigmatized for a lack of financial competence.  
These findings formulate recommendations on communication policies or protocols that 
could effectively convince the poor to use bank advisory services. The right combination would 
be to increase the salience of financial distress but also to message in a way that could drastically 
reduce stigma related to a lack of financial competence. The results also make the case for 
improving financial literacy, as they suggest that in contexts where finance-related concerns are 
salient, seeking financial advice will not appear as a complement for those who lack it (often the 
poor). 
Section 2 places our paper within the extant related literature and further motivates our 
analysis. Section 3 discusses our survey experiment alongside the empirical methodology to make 
causal claims. Section 4 discusses the empirical results, and section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations and motivation 
Our paper explores the link between financial vulnerability and attitudes toward seeking advice or 
help from bank advisors. As such, it relates to three strands of literature, which we discuss and 
develop our theoretical considerations and motivation. 
 
2.1. Demand for financial advice 
8 
 
The first related strand of literature identifies the factors affecting the demand for financial advice 
(Calcagno and Monticone, 2015; Collins 2012; Elmerick et al., 2002; Hackethal et al., 2012; 
Kramer 2016). The link between income or wealth and the use of financial advice (in investment 
products) is not the focus of this literature, with the relevant variables used as controls (thus causal 
effects are not explored). The general arguments from these studies are that high-income and high-
wealth households might have higher search opportunity costs, which induces them to ask for 
financial advice or pay for professional assistance (Elmerick et al., 2002; Hackethal et al., 2012; 
Kramer 2016).  
A more developed discussion in the literature on the demand for financial advice is about 
the role of financial literacy. This is pivotal in our setting because the poor are more likely to be 
financially illiterate. Kramer (2016) finds no relation between objective financial literacy and 
seeking financial advice.4 Similarly, Collins (2012) observes insignificant results regarding the 
demand for debt counseling. In sharp contrast, Calcagno and Monticone (2015) identify a positive 
effect, according to which financial literacy increases the demand for financial advice on portfolio 
choice from nonindependent professional advisors. The authors attribute this result to the 
expectations of more rational agents to extract rents from the information of professional advisors. 
Collins (2012) also finds a positive relation between financial literacy and seeking financial advice 
related to investments.  
Other studies identify a negative relation between financial literacy and seeking financial 
advice, which is attributed to financially literate individuals being better at gathering, processing, 
and managing information (Hackethal et al., 2012; Hung et al., 2009). Another possible 
explanation is that financially literate households are more aware of potential conflicts of interest 
                                                          
4 However, they find a negative relation when examining individuals’ confidence in their own financial literacy. 
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of professional advisors and thus are more hesitant to consult them (Hackethal et al., 2012; Inderst 
and Ottaviani, 2009).5 Considering debt advice, Disney et al. (2015) argue that financial literacy 
decreases the likelihood of using credit counseling, even after correcting for the negative selection 
bias induced by financially literate individuals being less likely to experience overindebtedness; 
they are hence less likely to find this type of advice useful. Similar conclusions emerge from 
Allgood and Walstad (2016).  
Evidently, these studies consider how economic shocks households experience affect the 
likelihood of them seeking debt counseling. They find a positive relationship. Because economic 
shocks increase the likelihood of falling on debt repayment, the demand for advice on how to deal 
with difficult situations better also increases. Again, this is of particular interest in our context 
because the poor might experience both default and overindebtedness; they are thus more likely to 
experience shocks (or the marginal effect of shocks). 
 
2.2. Stigma 
The second strand of literature related to our study posits that poverty does not solely reflect a lack 
of economic resources; it also reflects social status. Research in this area documents a shame 
associated with poverty or feeling poor (Chase and Walker, 2013; Hall et al., 2013; Li and Walker, 
2017; Reutter et al., 2009; Sutton et al., 2014; Walker et al., 2013; Walker and others 2014). Such 
shame, exacerbated by stigmas of poverty, lays on negative stereotypes and the social belief that 
the poor are lazy, incompetent, lack will-power, and are thus responsible for their economic 
difficulties.  
                                                          
5  For a review, see Kramer (2016). 
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Poverty stigmas are at the origins of social anxiety, leading many individuals to forego 
social assistance, mainly due to psychological costs associated with participating in means-tested 
welfare programs or applying for means-tested benefits (Baumberg 2016; Besley and Coate, 1992; 
Bhargava and Manoli, 2015; Currie 2004; Friedrichsen et al., 2018; Hall et al., 2013; Moffitt 1983; 
Stuber and Schlesinger, 2006). People experiencing economic distress can be stigmatized by the 
belief that their own misbehavior caused their situation. Such beliefs entail the view that it would 
be dishonest or undeserved to claim assistance. This literature also documents that aid recipients 
worry they will face hostile treatment if they apply for benefits. In addition, not participating in 
such means-tested programs could be part of a cognitive-distancing strategy. Avoiding services 
dedicated to the poor is a psychological means for some not to consider themselves poor and 
therefore not to self-apply negative stereotypes associated with poverty.  
Considering the goals of our study, poverty and stigma can reduce the willingness to 
interact with bank employees (Bertrand et al., 2004; 2006; Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). These 
studies put forward that the poor may feel stigmatized due to the perception that banks are not 
intended for people with low financial resources or who are clients of “lower value.” They also 
argue that stigmas can arise from a lack of financial competence, which might cause anxiety and 
embarrassment when anticipating difficulty understanding bank advisors and even contempt from 
bank advisors.  
Moreover, the poor are more likely to experience banking issues in the form of overdrafts, 
debit rejection, or nonperforming loans (and are more likely to pay penalty fees for such 
delinquencies). Thus, the banking environment is naturally less likely to be pleasant for them. Such 
situations might exacerbate the fear of being badly judged by the bank advisor. Brial and Rousselet 
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(2016) and Reydet (2018) suggest that bank employees can be less attentive and less devoted to 
poor customers, whom they may see as low value, time-consuming, and emotionally difficult.  
Based on the discussion in this section, we posit that stigmas around financial vulnerability 
decrease positive attitudes toward seeking advice from a bank advisor.  
 
2.3. Selective attention 
A third strand of literature documents that individuals tend to have selective attention, putting a 
cognitive distance between themselves and their own financial difficulties (Olafsson et al., 2018; 
Olafsson and Pagel, 2017; Sicherman et al., 2016; Stango and Zinman, 2014). Analyzing daily 
investor online account logins, Sicherman et al. (2016) find that account logins fall by 9.5% after 
market declines. In the same line, Olafsson et al. (2018) find that the likelihood that individuals 
consult their online financial accounts decreases with spending and overdraft, and increases with 
cash holdings, savings, and liquidity. Overall, these studies suggest that individuals prefer to ignore 
adverse financial situations rather than face them. 
In parallel, a growing number of studies examines the effect of salience, showing that more 
prominent or visible facts or situations draw individuals’ attention and have irrationally strong 
effects on subsequent financial behavior (Bordalo et al. 2012; 2013; 2020; Stango and Zinman 
2014). Close to our objectives, Stango and Zinman (2014) show that priming the salience of 
overdraft-related issues leads to an improvement in the following months. This suggests that 
bringing attention to an issue might lead individuals to act.  
Overall, in contrast with the potential role of stigma, selective attention can trigger a 




2.4. The roles of financial literacy and acute financial distress 
Two key characteristics of poor individuals that potentially affect the nexus between poverty and 
seeking financial advice are the high probabilities that these individuals lack financial literacy and 
experience acute financial distress.  
Poor individuals generally lacking financial literacy might feel anticipatory shame about 
their ability to understand a financial advisor, and this could deter them from seeking advice 
(Bertrand et al., 2004, 2006; Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). In that case, priming respondents 
should produce a stronger adverse effect on their attitude toward advisors, which exacerbates the 
negative effect of poverty on that attitude. On the other hand, if we adopt the view that priming 
the financial situation brings attention to issues related to financial situation and leads individuals 
to seek solutions, we arrive at the opposite conclusion. Specifically, priming might make 
individuals more aware of how to improve their financial situation, or at least keep it from 
deteriorating, with the help of an advisor. In that case, the effect of priming low-literacy 
respondents should be linked to priming, inducing a more positive attitude toward bank advisors 
among poor respondents.  
Similarly, contradicting expectations emerge when considering priming with the severity 
of individuals’ financial distress (e.g., overindebtedness). On one hand, having a particularly 
critical financial situation might exacerbate anticipatory feelings of shame and discomfort even at 
the thought of discussing these issues with a banking advisor (Bertrand et al., 2004, 2006; 
Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). On the other hand, selective attention and focusing on financial 
difficulties might lead individuals to consider the idea of consulting an advisor to solve their 
problems. In this case, there should be a more positive attitude among poor respondents with 
respect to seeking financial advice. 
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3. Data and empirical methodology 
3.1. The survey experiment 
We collect our data from the 2015 Audencia Barometer – Banque Populaire survey on French 
Financial Vulnerability that we co-constructed. This is an online survey conducted on our behalf 
by the market research firm Brulé, Ville et Associés group (BVA) between April 28 and May 6, 
2015. It involves 1,001 respondents above 18 years old who are representative of the French 
population (we provide relevant summary statistics below). The survey uses the quota sampling 
method based on respondents’ sex, age, occupation, and geographical area following the national 
census data from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE).6 
The treatment group includes 500 randomly drawn respondents, and the control group 
includes 501 respondents.7 Treatment entails priming in order to make poverty-related financial 
concerns top of mind among low-income respondents ( Bartoš et al. 2021; Liu et al., 2012; Mani 
et al., 2013). Priming entails asking four questions about the frequency of debit rejection, 
exceeding overdraft limits, the ability to save money, and vulnerability to income shocks (Table 1 
shows the questions). The four priming questions follow several other questions on topics related 
to respondents’ management of their finances. The treatment group answers the four priming 
questions first and then answers a set of 24 questions, which include five questions about attitudes 
toward bank advisors.8 We report the 24 questions in section A1 of the appendix. The control 
group, on the other hand, answers the four priming questions at the end of the survey (after the 24 
questions); thus, the control group is not affected by priming.  
                                                          
6 Delis et al. (2021) use the same survey. 
7A growing number of studies use randomized survey-experiment designs in economics and finance (e.g., Alesina et 
al., 2018; Brown et al., 2019; Karadja et al., 2017; Kuziemko et al., 2015). 
8 Besides questions on attitudes toward bank advisors, the 24 questions address self-confidence in financial capability 
(five questions besides question 3), financial literacy in the form of a quiz (six questions), the use of heuristics (two 
questions), emotions linked to finance (three questions), and budget behavioral intentions (three questions). 
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[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 A potential criticism on the experiment’s design is that priming intensity is weak because 
the subjects might spend little time on each of the priming questions, just as they do so for all other 
questions. However, priming is effective without being intense (Cohn and Maréchal, 2016). 
Inspired by social psychology literature, other finance papers find significant effects of priming in 
the form of simply asking people to record their gender (Carr and Steele, 2010), rating financial 
preferences (Lee et al., 2011), or answering few questions related to their professional background 
(Cohn et al., 2014). Another potential criticism is that our experiment does not have a 
compensation structure, so the subjects put less time and effort into the more difficult questions. 
There are two reasons for this choice. First, the most important goal of our paper is to show 
different reactions toward bank advisors by income. Introducing a compensation scheme would be 
endogenous to individuals’ economic condition, making the responses of low-income subjects 
incomparable to the rest. Second, we examine whether the poor understand the actual reward (and 
associated motive), namely the potential improvement in their financial condition, based on 
receiving relevant advice. Along this line, a monetary reward to take financial advice would not 
occur in the actual world. 
We remove from our sample individuals who do not report income (116 observations), 
because this information is crucial for our analysis. In addition, we drop 197 individuals who 
answer “I do not know” or “not concerned” to any of the four priming questions. Thus, our end 
sample includes 688 respondents, of which 335 belong to the control group and 353 to the (primed) 
treatment group. A t-test of differences in the means indicates that the frequency of dropped 
observations does not differ across the treatment and control groups (p-value = 0.203). 
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We first test the random assignment of the treatment by verifying the homogeneity of the 
treatment and control groups with respect to observed characteristics (Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009). We compare the respondents’ characteristics, including gender, age, occupation, 
geographic area, education, marital status, and dwelling type. We define these variables in Table 
2 and report summary statistics in Table 3. We estimate a t-test of the equality of means, and the 
results in Table 4 essentially show that the two samples are homogeneous. The only exceptions 
are Separated (significant at the 10% level) and Widow(er) (significant at the 5% level). Even in 
these two cases, however, the normalized differences across treatment (equal to 0.10 and 0.13, 
respectively) are well below the rule-of-thumb value of 0.25, suggesting no particular statistical 
problem from these differences when inferring the average treatment effect (Imbens and 
Wooldridge 2009).9  
[Insert Tables 2, 3, and 4 about here] 
The five questions about the attitudes toward bank advisors are questions 3, 15, 16, 17, and 
18 from the 24 questions in section A1 of the appendix. Question 3 addresses whether individuals 
feel confident about having a discussion with a financial advisor. Question 15 addresses the fear 
of being judged based on having little financial competence. Question 16 addresses whether people 
feel shame when talking about overspending with bank advisors. Question 17 is about the 
relevance of bank advisors in addressing financial distress issues. Question 18 relates to the 
helpfulness of consulting with bank advisors before making an important financial decision.  
Based on answers to these five questions, we create five ordinal variables, Positive attitude 
1 to Positive attitude 5 (exact definitions are in Table 2). From these variables we build two scores 
                                                          
9 The formula is 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 =  Δ𝑋 = ?̅?𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡−?̅?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙√𝜎𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡2 +𝜎𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙2 , where ?̅? is the mean and  𝜎2 is the variance 
of each sample (treatment and control).  
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that are key in our baseline empirical analysis. The first is Positive attitude, which measures 
positive attitude toward bank advisors. The second is Nonextreme attitude, which is the frequency 
at which individuals do not select the highest or the lowest values (extremes). This variable 
measures rejecting extreme attitudes toward bank advisors and hence reflects a possible two-sided 
effect of priming, whereby individuals are at the same time less likely to show strong reluctance 
and strong enthusiasm.  
 
3.2. Baseline empirical specification 
Our baseline specification entails estimating two models using OLS:10 
 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼2 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝛼3 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 +  𝛼4 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝑢 (1)  𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 = 𝛼′0 + 𝛼′1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼′2 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 +𝛼′3 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 +  𝛼′4 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙s + 𝑢′ (2) 
 
We thoroughly define all variables in Table 2. Below poverty line is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if individuals are below the poverty line, and 0 otherwise. The French National Institute for 
Statistics (INSEE) defines the poverty line as 60% of the median household standard of living. 
The measure of standard of living is “effective income,” which is the ratio of household income to 
the square root of household size. Our calculations lead to a poverty line of €1,050.11  
                                                          
10 For similar specifications, see Mani et al. (2013) and Wicherts and Scholten (2013). 
11 INSEE’s 2017 poverty line using standards of living is €1,041 per month. 
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In equations (1) and (2), 𝛼3 and 𝛼′3 reflect the differential effect of priming on the 
dependent variable for a discrete change in Below poverty line. The parameters 𝛼0 and 𝛼′0 
represent the baseline level of the dependent variable for nonprimed and individuals that are above 
the poverty line (i.e., Below poverty line = 0).12 The parameters 𝛼1 and 𝛼′1 represent the effect of 
priming for nonpoor respondents. The parameters 𝛼2 and 𝛼′2 capture the marginal effect of Below 
poverty line for nonprimed respondents.  
For an appropriate randomization of the experimental approach, including control variables 
should have a limited effect on the coefficient of the interaction term (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
A first check on this is the homogeneity of the observable characteristics in the two groups 
(treatment and control), this time for the two subsamples reflecting Below poverty line = 0 and 
Below poverty line = 1. The statistics are in Table A1 of the appendix. For both groups, the 
normalized differences are well below the rule-of-thumb value of 0.25, except for two variables 
out of 37 (South-West and Hosted) in the low-income group but for which the excess is low (both 
are at 0.28).13 We therefore conclude that there is very limited heterogeneity of groups across 
treatment status for these income levels (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). 
 
4. Baseline results 
In Table 5, we report tests of the differences in the means of our outcome variables for the treated 
and control groups. The results show insignificant differences across the treatment and control 
groups (irrespective of income levels), which is an important first result for the validity of our 
                                                          
12 This interpretation is valid if covariates in the vector Control are mean-centered. 
13  Imbens (2015, 396) depicts as “modest” a level of normalized difference below 0.30. 
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empirical approach. This means that in the whole sample, irrespective of the level of poverty, we 
cannot conclude that priming affects respondents’ attitudes. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 report the baseline results from the OLS estimation of 
equations (1) and (2), respectively. In column 1, the coefficients on Priming and on Priming × 
Below poverty line are statistically insignificant. Thus, priming does not trigger any positive or 
negative effect on the general attitude toward banking advice for both the poor and the nonpoor.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
In contrast, specification 2 shows that the coefficient on Priming × Below poverty line is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the effect of priming on 
Nonextreme attitudes among the poor is significantly different from that among the nonpoor that 
is itself statistically insignificant (𝛼1 = -0.133). Specifically, among low-income respondents, 
priming increases Nonextreme attitudes by 0.762 points (𝛼1 + 𝛼3= - 0.133 + 0.895) versus an 
insignificant decrease of 0.133 (𝛼1) among nonpoor respondents. Given that the mean value of 
Nonextreme attitudes equals 3.02, this is a large effect economically (approximately equal to a 
25% increase). 
We first examine the sensitivity of these results to a bad controls problem by sequentially 
adding demographic variables. We report these results in Table A2 of the appendix. The estimates 
on the interaction terms and our general inferences are unaffected, which indicates a robust 
randomized experiment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, the dependent variables are based on a breakdown of 
Nonextreme attitudes. Specifically, we use Extreme negative attitudes, which shows an extremely 
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negative attitude toward bank advisors, and Extreme positive attitudes, which shows an extremely 
positive attitude (exact definitions and summary statistics are in tables 2 and 3, respectively).  
In both these regressions, the coefficients on Priming × Below poverty line are negative 
and statistically significant (at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively). Thus, the results in column 2 
emanate from two simultaneous effects: a positive effect, whereby priming makes individuals 
below the poverty line less likely to show an extremely negative attitude toward bank advisors, 
and a negative effect, whereby priming makes individuals below the poverty line less likely to 
show extremely positive attitudes in this matter. 
Figure 1 illustrates these results by plotting the predicted values of Extreme negative 
attitudes and Extreme positive attitudes, depending on the level of effective income and the 
priming status. On the left-hand side graph, priming significantly decreases Extreme negative 
attitudes of poor individuals by 0.532 (i.e., 𝛼1 + 𝛼3= 0.0627 – 0.595), from 1.245 (i.e., 𝛼0 + 𝛼2 = 
0.930 + 0.315) among nonprimed individuals to 0.713 (i.e., 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 = 0.930 + 0.0627 
+ 0.315 – 0.595) among primed individuals. In contrast, this spread is low and insignificant among 
individuals who are above the poverty line (𝛼1 = 0.0627). Consistent with our theoretical 
arguments, with their economic condition at the forefront, individuals below the poverty line are 
less likely to report an extremely negative attitude toward seeking advice from bank advisors; this 
is the positive effect we uncover in our study. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
On the right-hand side graph, priming significantly decreases Extreme positive attitudes 
among poor individuals by 0.279 (i.e., 𝛼1 + 𝛼3= 0.0797 – 0.359), from 1.14838 (i.e., 𝛼0 + 𝛼2 = 
1.141 + 0.00738) among nonprimed individuals to 0.86908 (i.e., 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 + 𝛼2 + 𝛼3 = 1.141 + 
0.0797 + 0.00738 – 0.359) among primed individuals. In contrast, this spread is low and 
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insignificant among individuals above the poverty line (𝛼1 = 0.0797). Consistent with our 
theoretical arguments, with their economic condition at the forefront, individuals below the 
poverty line are less likely to report an extremely positive attitude toward seeking advice from 
bank advisors; this is the negative effect we uncover in our study. 
In column 5 of Table 6 we examine whether the observed nonextreme response of poor 
individuals to priming (i.e., the positive and negative effects) is indeed specific to the questions 
used to construct Nonextreme attitudes and not to other attitudes captured by the 24 questions in 
the appendix.14 To this end, we construct the variable Nonextreme other attitudes based on all other 
questions besides those related to attitudes toward banking advisors (definition in Table 2 and 
summary statistics in Table 3). For instance, we add 1 to this variable if a respondent does not 
choose the uppermost or the bottom rating in question 4 of section A1 in the appendix, which 
addresses confidence in the ability to read an account statement. We find that the coefficient on 
Priming × Below poverty line is statistically insignificant, showing that the effects in columns 2-
4 are specific for seeking banking advice and not due to a general change in the response style 
induced by priming. 
 
5. Financial literacy and acute financial distress 
In line with our theoretical considerations in section 2.4, we next examine the role of financial 
literacy and/or acute financial distress in our baseline results. The rationale is that both a lack of 
financial literacy and an acute financial distress are typical elements of poverty, which could 
                                                          
14 For studies about specific response style — that is, when respondents use a systematic way of answering survey 
questions regardless of the content of the question — see Greenleaf (1992) and Meisenberg and Williams (2008).  
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intervene in the cognitive process induced by priming the poor. We estimate the following 
equations:  
 𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼2 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝛼3 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝛼4 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 +𝛼5 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 +𝛼6 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝛼7 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠+𝛼8 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙s + u      (3) 
𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 = 𝛼′0 + 𝛼′1 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛼′2 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝛼′3 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝛼′4 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 +𝛼′5 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 +𝛼′6 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 × 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 + 𝛼′7 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 ×  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 +  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙s + u     (4) 
 
We obtain Financial literacy from answers to the financial literacy quiz (section A1 of the 
appendix, definition in Table 2, and summary statistics in Table 3). Financial distress is from 
respondents’ answers to the four questions used for priming (questions in Table 1, definition in 
Table 2, and summary statistics in Table 3). This variable captures acute financial distress by 
measuring whether individuals have recently fallen behind on a payment (priming questions 1 and 
2 in Table 1) or are very close to doing so (priming questions 3 and 4 in Table 1). Obviously, both 
Financial literacy and Financial distress strongly correlate with Below poverty line (see appendix 
Table A3).15 
These regressions examine the significance of Priming × Financial literacy and Priming 
× Financial distress, as well as the sensitivity of the coefficient on Priming × Below poverty line 
compared to the results of Table 6. In other words, we aim to show that a lack of financial literacy 
                                                          
15 Financial distress must not be confounded with poverty based on the definition of the poverty line, because one 
could experience acute financial difficulties (e.g., financial shortcomings, overindebtedness, etc.) while having high 
income and vice-versa. 
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and experiencing acute financial distress underlay the negative and/or positive effect induced by 
priming poor individuals. If this is the case, then the coefficient on Priming × Below poverty line 
when estimating equations (3) and (4) should significantly decrease in statistical and economic 
significance compared to the baseline results. 
Table 7 shows the results, using equation (3) in panel A and equation (4) in panel B. 
Column 1 simply replicates the equivalent results in Table 6 for comparability purposes. Column 
2 of panel A shows that the coefficient on Priming × Below poverty line is only lightly affected 
when introducing Priming × Financial literacy. Introducing Priming × Financial distress in 
column 3 has a stronger impact on Priming × Below poverty line, which remains statistically 
significant.16 In column 4, we include both Priming × Financial literacy and Priming × Financial 
distress. We confirm using Wald tests that the drop in the value of the coefficient on Priming × 
Below poverty line caused by adding Priming × Financial literacy is statistically insignificant, 
whereas it is significant at the 5% level when adding Priming × Financial distress. Again, the 
coefficient on Priming × Below poverty line is significant at the 5% level.  
We thus conclude that the positive effect of priming the poor (i.e., lowering their extreme 
negative attitude toward bank advisors) is significantly (even though not entirely) driven by 
individuals in financial distress. This is consistent with the view developed in our theoretical 
considerations that financial vulnerability forces individuals to focus on their financial issues, 
making them more likely to seek solutions.17 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
                                                          
16 Simply introducing the main terms for Financial literacy and Financial distress does not affect the coefficient on 
Priming × Below poverty line (results available on request). 
17 We also examine the effect of the three-way interaction term Priming × Below poverty line × Financial literacy. 
We find that this carries an insignificant coefficient. The interpretation is that the effect of Priming × Below poverty 
line is not affected (neither strengthened nor weakened) by varying levels of financial literacy across primed poor 
respondents. The same holds when we add Priming × Below poverty line × Financial distress. 
23 
 
Column 2 of panel B shows that the coefficient on Priming × Below poverty line is strongly 
affected by introducing Priming × Financial literacy and becomes insignificant. In column 3, 
introducing Priming × Financial distress barely affects the coefficient on Priming × Below 
poverty line.18 Column 4 reports the results from the regression with both Priming × Financial 
literacy and Priming × Financial distress. Wald tests show that the drop in the value of the 
coefficient on Priming × Below poverty line caused by adding Priming × Financial literacy is 
significant at the 10% level, whereas its change is insignificant when adding Priming × Financial 
distress.19  
We thus conclude that the negative effect of priming the poor (i.e., lowering the extreme 
positive attitude toward bank advisors) is mainly driven by individuals with low financial literacy. 
This is consistent with our theoretical considerations that the salience of financial vulnerability 
increases the fear of stigmas based on having low financial competence, making the subjects less 
likely to seek solutions from an advisor.20 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
Our study provides evidence that increasing the salience of finances modifies poor individuals’ 
attitude toward consulting with a bank advisor. We find a two-sided effect. A positive effect makes 
relatively poor individuals less likely to show an extremely negative attitude, and a negative effect 
makes them less likely to show an extremely positive attitude. We further find that the positive 
effect is partially transmitted through primed individuals focusing on the problem and seeking 
                                                          
18 Again, introducing the main terms for Financial literacy and Financial distress does not affect our inferences. 
19 Delis et al. (2019) find that priming affects Financial literacy as poverty increases. This, however, should not affect 
the validity of the current Wald test, because we control for the main effect of Financial literacy and introducing it 
alone has no impact on our results. 
20 Again, introducing the relevant three-way interaction terms does not affect our inferences. 
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advice for solutions. On the other hand, we also find evidence that a lack of financial literacy limits 
the willingness to seek advice from the bank. This is consistent with theoretical considerations that 
financial vulnerability increases the fear of being judged at the bank because of a lack of financial 
competence. 
This paper has important policy implications with respect to awareness campaigns that seek 
to increase banking inclusion via advising services and help for financially vulnerable individuals. 
Based on our findings, the right combination is to increase the salience of financial distress but 
also to think of a message that could drastically reduce the stigma related to lack of financial 
competence. Our results also make the case for improving financial competences of poor 
individuals via education programs or campaigns on the positive role of bank advisors.  
This paper also has managerial implications for the banking sector. The ethics of financial 
institutions have been questioned after the subprime crisis and associated scandals, implying a 
culture of greed and dishonesty (Cohn et al. 2014; Fichter 2018). In Western financial systems, 
banks’ ability to assist the most vulnerable clients has improved in the recent past in an effort to 
repair reputational damage. This development is accompanied by a legal reinforcement of 
consumer protection rules making it mandatory for all banks to propose personalized financial 
monitoring and support for fragile customers.  
Along that line, our study gives CSR bank managers a better understanding of the 
psychological mechanisms affecting the willingness among poor or potentially poor clients to 
consult with the bank. Specifically, bank consultants should be aware that a lack of financial 
competence among poor clients can be a source of tension during meetings. At the same time, 
however, the mere presence of these clients at the bank shows recognition of the bank consultants’ 
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Table 1. Priming questions 
Question number  Question text   
   
1 In the last two years, could you indicate to which frequency you have experienced? 
a direct debit rejection: never / rarely / from time to time / often / not concerned (if no bank account); 
  
2 In the last two years, could you indicate to which frequency you have experienced? 
/ a bypassing of your overdraft authorization: never / rarely / from time to time / often / not concerned (if 
no bank account) 
  
3 Over the last 12 months, did you: 
• Save money from your income; 
• Meet your current expenses but could not spare money; 
• Tap into your savings to meet my current expenses; 
• Tap into your savings and borrow some money to meet my current expenses. 
• I do not know 
  
4 If you were losing your main income resource, how long would you be able to cover your current 
expenses without borrowing money or returning your home? 
• Less than a week; 
• Between one week and less than one month; 
• Between one month and less than three months; 
• Between three months and less than six months; 
• More than six months. 






Table 2. Variable definitions 
Variable  Definition 
  
A. Dependent variable 
Positive attitude 1 Positive attitude 1 is derived from the rating in Question 3, taking the value 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5. 
 
Positive attitude 2 Positive attitude 2 is derived from the rating in Question 15. It takes the value 1, 2, 3 or 4 if the 
respondent answered “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly 
disagree”, respectively. 
 
Positive attitude 3 Positive attitude 3 is derived from the rating in Question 16. It respectively takes the value 1, 2, 3 and 
4 if the respondent answered “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly 
disagree” to the question. 
 
Positive attitude 4 Positive attitude 4 is derived from the rating in Question 17. It respectively takes the value 1, 2, 3 and 
4 if the respondent answered “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly 
disagree” to the question. 
 
Positive attitude 5 Positive attitude 5 is derived from the rating in Question 18. It respectively takes the value 1, 2, 3 and 
4 if the respondent answered “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly 
disagree” to the question. 
 
Positive attitudes Score capturing a positive attitude toward the banking advisor, obtained from the equation 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑠 = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 1 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 2 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒  3 + 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 4 +𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 5 
 
Nonextreme attitude Score capturing the opposite of an extreme attitude toward the banking advisor. It is obtained by adding 
1 for each non-extreme rating (i.e., middle points of scales) in Question 3, 15, 16, 17, 18. For instance 
1 is added to Nonextreme attitude if individuals answered “somewhat agree” or “somewhat disagree” 




Score capturing an extremely negative attitude toward the banking advisor. It is obtained by adding 1 
for each extremely low rating for Question 3, 15, 16, 17, 18. For instance 1 is added to Extreme negative 




Score capturing an extreme attitude (positive or negative) toward the banking advisor. It is obtained by 
adding 1 for each extremely high rating for Question 3, 15, 16, 17, 18. For instance 1 is added to 




Score obtained by adding 1 for each non-extreme rating (i.e. middle points of scales) for Questions 1, 
2, 4, 5, 6, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 (i.e. questions measuring other attitudes than that related to financial 
advisors). For instance, 1 is added to Nonextreme other attitudes if individuals answered, “somewhat 
agree” or “somewhat disagree” (and not “strongly agree” nor “strongly disagree”) to Question 1. 
  
B. Key explanatory variables 
Priming A dummy variable indicating whether the respondent answers questions about his/her economic 
condition early in the questionnaire (priming) or later in the questionnaire. It equals 1 for primed 







Effective income = household income / squared root (household size). The respondents report the range 
of their monthly disposable income (below €1,000; between €1,000 and €2,000; between €1,000 and 
€2,000; between €2,000 and €3,000; between €3,000 and €4,000; between €4,000 and €5,000; and 





€1,000 and €2,000”). For the upper range, which has no upper bound, we assign a virtual income of 
€10,000. 
 
Below poverty line A dummy variable taking the value 1 if respondents have an effective income lower than or equal to 
€1060.66 per month, and 0 otherwise. 
Financial literacy The sum of correct answers to the six financial literacy questions (questions 7 to 12 in Appendix 1). It 
equals 0, 1,…, 6, corresponding to the number of correct answers. 
 
Financial distress Score measuring the level of financial difficulties encountered by the respondent. It is obtained by 
summing encoded ratings for the four questions used for priming. The first and second question are 
coded as follows: 1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3= from time to time, 4 = often; the third question is rated on a 
four point scale: 1 = Save money from your income, 2= Meet your current expenses but could not spare 
money,  3 = Tap into your savings to meet my current expenses, 4 = Tap into your savings and borrow 
some money to meet my current expenses; and the fourth question rated on a five points scale: 1 = More 
than six months, 2 = Between three months and less than six months, 3 = Between one month and less 
than three months, 4 = Between one week and less than one month; 5 = Less than a week. 
 
  
D. Other variables  
Age A continuous variable equal to the respondent’s age. 
Woman A dummy variable equal to 1 for female respondents and 0 for male respondents. 
Education This is a vector of 4 dummy variables (Low education, Intermediate education, High education, Don’t 
know) that equal 1 if the respondent reports the corresponding level of education and 0 otherwise. 
Occupation 
 
This is a vector of 9 dummy variables (Agriculture; Artisan, merchant, firm director; Inactive; 
Executive or intellectual profession; Student; Employee; Factory worker; Intermediate profession; 
Retiree) that equal 1 if the respondent reports the corresponding type of occupation, and 0 otherwise. 
Area 
 
This is a vector of 9 dummy variables (Ile de France, North, East, East of Parisian Basin, West of 
Parisian Basin, West, Southwest, Southeast, Mediterranea) that equal value 1 if the respondent reports 
this living area, and 0 otherwise. 
Marital status 
 
This is a vector of 5 dummy variables (Single, Divorced, Married or civil union, Separated, Widow(er)) 
that equal 1 if the respondent reports this marital status, and 0 otherwise. 
Dwelling situation 
 
This is a vector of 7 dummy variables (House owner (with mortgage), House owner (no mortgage), 
Hosted, Tenant, Tenant (low-cost housing), Other (dwelling), Don’t know (dwelling)) that equal 1 if 
the respondent reported this dwelling situation, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
The table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for the variables 
used in our empirical analysis. All variables are defined in Table 2. 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Positive attitudes 688 13.02 2.50 5 21 
Nonextreme attitudes 688 3.02 1.44 0 5 
Extreme negative attitudes 688 0.89 1.12 0 5 
Extreme positive attitudes 688 1.09 1.01 0 5 
Nonextreme other attitudes 688 5.71 2.27 0 11 
Financial literacy 688 3.47 1.54 0 6 
Financial distress 688 7.32 2.79 4 17 
Effective income 688 €1,983.60 €1,422.80 €204.12 €10,000 
Below poverty line 688 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Age 688 47.50 16.35 18 88 
Woman 688 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Low education 688 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Intermediate education 688 0.18 0.39 0 1 
High education 688 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Don’t know (education) 688 0.00 0.054 0 1 
Agriculteur 688 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Artisan, merchant, company director 688 0.03 0.18 0 1 
Inactive 688 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Executive or intellectual profession 688 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Student 688 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Employee 688 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Factory worker 688 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Intermediate profession 688 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Retiree 688 0.29 0.46 0 1 
Ile de France 688 0.19 0.39 0 1 
North 688 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Est 688 0.08 0.27 0 1 
East of Parisian Basin 688 0.08 0.27 0 1 
West of Parisian Basin 688 0.09 0.29 0 1 
West 688 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Southwest 688 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Southeast 688 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Mediterranean 688 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Single 688 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Divorced 688 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Married or civil union 688 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Separated 688 0.02 0.15 0 1 
Widow(er) 688 0.04 0.19 0 1 
House owner (with mortgage) 688 0.20 0.40 0 1 
House owner (no mortgage) 688 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Hosted 688 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Tenant 688 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Tenant (low-cost housing) 688 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Other (dwelling) 688 0.01 0.12 0 1 
Don’t know (dwelling) 688 0.00 0.04 0 1 
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Table 4. Randomization checks on demographics 
The table reports the results from t-tests of the difference in means, as well as the normalized difference of the 




Treatment group  
N= 353   





Below poverty line 0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.14 0.08 
Age 47.47 16.46 47.54 16.28 0.95 0.00 
Woman 0.51 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.03 
Low education 0.30 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.90 0.01 
Intermediate education 0.21 0.41 0.16 0.37 0.13 0.08 
High education 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.15 -0.08 
Don’t know (education) 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.08 
Agriculteur 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.66 -0.02 
Artisan, merchant, company director 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.19 0.61 -0.03 
Inactive 0.07 0.25 0.08 0.27 0.58 -0.03 
Executive or intellectual profession 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.32 0.38 -0.05 
Student 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21 0.55 -0.03 
Employee 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.68 0.02 
Factory worker 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.31 0.19 0.07 
Intermediate profession 0.13 0.34 0.15 0.36 0.55 -0.03 
Retiree 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 0.49 0.04 
Ile de France 0.17 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.40 -0.05 
North 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.88 -0.01 
Est 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.83 -0.01 
East of Parisian Basin 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.28 0.52 -0.04 
West of Parisian Basin 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 0.31 0.05 
West 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.35 0.05 
Southwest 0.13 0.33 0.09 0.29 0.18 0.07 
Southeast 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.35 0.28 -0.06 
Mediterranean 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 0.85 -0.01 
Single 0.27 0.45 0.27 0.44 0.94 0.00 
Divorced 0.06 0.23 0.08 0.27 0.24 -0.06 
Married or civil union 0.61 0.49 0.60 0.49 0.83 0.01 
Separated 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.18 0.06 -0.10 
Widow(er) 0.05 0.23 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.13 
House owner (with mortgage) 0.20 0.40 0.21 0.41 0.75 -0.02 
House owner (no mortgage) 0.39 0.49 0.42 0.49 0.50 -0.04 
Hosted 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 0.51 0.04 
Tenant 0.25 0.43 0.24 0.43 0.76 0.02 
Tenant (low-cost housing) 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.84 0.01 
Other (dwelling) 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11 0.47 0.04 
Don’t know (dwelling) 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.05 
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Table 5. Effect of priming in the full sample 
The table reports the results from a t-test of the difference in means for the outcome variables in our 
analysis among primed and nonprimed respondents (irrespective of respondents’ income level). The 
*, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable 
Priming = 0 
N= 335 
Priming = 1 
N= 353 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
t-test 
p-value 
Outcome variable      
Positive attitudes 12.92 2.56 13.10 2.44 0.34 
Nonextreme attitudes 2.96 1.45 3.09 1.44 0.23 
Extreme negative attitudes 0.96 1.18 0.83 1.05 0.13 
Extreme positive attitudes 1.09 0.99 1.08 1.04 0.95 
Nonextreme other attitudes 5.65 2.40 5.77 2.15 0.48 
37 
 
Table 6. Baseline results 
The table reports estimation results (coefficient estimates and t-statistics in brackets) from the estimation of equations 1 or 2. The dependent 
variable is given on the first line of the table. The estimation method is OLS with robust standard errors (clustered by individual). All variables 
are defined in Table 2. The lower part of the table reports the number of observations and the R-squared. The *, **, and *** marks denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 








Priming 0.00999 -0.133 0.0627 0.0797 0.0104 
 [0.05] [-1.08] [0.66] [0.91] [0.05] 
Below poverty line -0.534 -0.305 0.315* 0.00738 -0.166 
 [-1.59] [-1.49] [1.87] [0.06] [-0.50] 
Priming × Below poverty line 0.400 0.895*** -0.595*** -0.359** 0.321 
 [0.93] [3.47] [-2.93] [-2.07] [0.78] 
Age 0.0165 -0.00273 -0.00332 0.00632 -0.00584 
 [1.42] [-0.43] [-0.66] [1.45] [-0.57] 
Woman 0.0695 -0.0659 0.0117 0.0591 -0.141 
 [0.34] [-0.57] [0.13] [0.73] [-0.78] 
Low education -0.717*** 0.103 0.169 -0.283*** 0.200 
 [-2.79] [0.65] [1.40] [-2.68] [0.81] 
Intermediate education -0.502* -0.0850 0.252** -0.165 -0.193 
 [-1.94] [-0.56] [2.11] [-1.62] [-0.74] 
I don’t know (education) 2.736*** -0.372 -0.417 0.824*** 2.732*** 
 [4.01] [-1.06] [-1.31] [3.73] [4.89] 
Agriculteur -0.875* -0.374 0.421 -0.0255 0.693 
 [-1.65] [-0.79] [1.16] [-0.11] [0.93] 
Artisan, merchant, firm director -0.152 -0.223 0.173 0.0641 0.0787 
 [-0.29] [-0.72] [0.71] [0.33] [0.14] 
Inactive 0.462 -0.516* 0.195 0.357* -0.532 
 [0.89] [-1.76] [0.87] [1.68] [-1.33] 
Executive, intellectual prof. -0.0750 -0.153 0.183 -0.0211 -0.174 
 [-0.16] [-0.62] [0.92] [-0.12] [-0.43] 
Student -0.319 0.372 -0.0620 -0.338 0.557 
 [-0.47] [0.95] [-0.20] [-1.30] [0.93] 
Employee -0.658 -0.0260 0.214 -0.189 -0.243 
 [-1.37] [-0.10] [1.01] [-1.05] [-0.59] 
Factory worker -0.260 -0.337 0.201 0.159 -0.573 
 [-0.62] [-1.29] [1.01] [0.90] [-1.35] 
Intermediate profession -0.366 0.264 -0.0416 -0.242 0.357 
 [-0.88] [1.12] [-0.23] [-1.49] [0.91] 
Ile de France 0.649* 0.119 -0.203 0.0779 -0.0880 
 [1.90] [0.63] [-1.33] [0.60] [-0.28] 
North 0.127 0.281 -0.141 -0.159 0.134 
 [0.29] [0.97] [-0.64] [-0.92] [0.28] 
Est 0.609 0.350 -0.343* -0.0285 0.224 
 [1.43] [1.52] [-1.82] [-0.19] [0.57] 
East of Parisian Basin 0.424 0.0255 -0.202 0.177 0.103 
 [1.03] [0.10] [-1.15] [0.97] [0.26] 
West of Parisian Basin -0.0429 0.0211 0.0177 -0.0408 0.144 
 [-0.10] [0.09] [0.10] [-0.24] [0.38] 
West 0.218 -0.0623 0.0259 0.0408 -0.108 
 [0.58] [-0.30] [0.15] [0.29] [-0.32] 
South-West 0.754** 0.0444 -0.266 0.223 -0.192 
 [1.98] [0.21] [-1.57] [1.55] [-0.58] 
South-East 0.363 0.321 -0.301* -0.0394 0.611* 
 [1.04] [1.53] [-1.78] [-0.29] [1.95] 
Single 0.476 0.153 -0.232 0.0715 -0.367 
 [0.67] [0.41] [-0.75] [0.26] [-0.73] 
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Divorced 0.764 0.386 -0.470 0.0618 -0.391 
 [1.06] [0.98] [-1.45] [0.21] [-0.73] 
Married or civil union 0.981 0.155 -0.413 0.253 -0.0323 
 [1.48] [0.44] [-1.40] [0.97] [-0.07] 
Separated 0.790 0.608 -0.463 -0.185 -0.165 
 [0.91] [1.23] [-1.22] [-0.52] [-0.22] 
House owner (with mortgage) 0.0818 0.439*** -0.259** -0.210* 0.386 
 [0.31] [2.71] [-2.12] [-1.82] [1.51] 
Hosted -0.100 -0.175 0.175 0.0105 -0.373 
 [-0.16] [-0.59] [0.65] [0.05] [-0.85] 
Tenant -0.178 0.263 -0.117 -0.164 0.585** 
 [-0.61] [1.49] [-0.89] [-1.28] [2.03] 
Tenant (low cost housing) -0.395 0.0225 0.0498 -0.0749 0.246 
 [-1.04] [0.09] [0.27] [-0.50] [0.62] 
Other (dwelling) 0.0182 -0.0217 -0.166 0.192 0.466 
 [0.02] [-0.05] [-0.48] [0.58] [0.71] 
Don’t know (dwelling) -0.643 3.109*** -1.224*** -2.104*** 0.612 
 [-0.78] [7.13] [-3.18] [-7.38] [0.85] 
Extreme positive attitudes   -0.0756*   
   [-1.95]   
Extreme negative attitudes    -0.0602*  
    [-1.95]  
Constant 13.10*** 3.063*** 0.930*** 1.141*** 5.710*** 
 [86.82] [34.28] [10.87] [16.82] [36.63] 
Observations 688 688 688 688 688 
R2 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.06 
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Table 7. The importance of financial literacy and financial distress 
The table reports estimation results (coefficient estimates and t-statistics in brackets) from the estimation of 
equations 3 or 4. The dependent variable in Panel A is Extreme negative attitudes and Extreme positive attitudes in 
Panel B. The estimation method is OLS with robust standard errors (clustered by individual). Financial literacy and 
Financial distress are mean centered for easier interpretation of the intercept and main terms. The regressions 
include the same controls as in Table 6. All variables are defined in Table 2. The lower part of each panel reports 
the number of observations and the R-squared. The *, **, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Priming 0.0627 0.0507 0.0196 0.0207 
 [0.66] [0.52] [0.20] [0.21] 
Below poverty line 0.315* 0.288* 0.241 0.239 
 [1.87] [1.67] [1.39] [1.37] 
Priming × Below poverty line -0.595*** -0.552** -0.453** -0.454** 
 [-2.93] [-2.58] [-2.15] [-2.09] 
Financial literacy  -0.0611  -0.0356 
  [-1.30]  [-0.76] 
Priming × Financial literacy  0.0551  0.00661 
  [0.95]  [0.11] 
Financial distress   0.0486* 0.0444* 
   [1.92] [1.74] 
Priming × Financial distress   -0.0753** -0.0748** 
   [-2.29] [-2.23] 
Constant 0.930*** 0.933*** 0.953*** 0.948*** 
 [10.87] [10.76] [10.99] [10.84] 
Observations 688 688 688 688 
R2 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Panel B 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Priming 0.0797 0.0531 0.109 0.0887 
 [0.91] [0.61] [1.23] [1.01] 
Below poverty line 0.00738 -0.0320 0.0601 0.0275 
 [0.06] [-0.25] [0.47] [0.21] 
Priming × Below poverty line -0.359** -0.252 -0.371** -0.301* 
 [-2.07] [-1.42] [-2.06] [-1.67] 
Financial literacy  0.0548  0.0193 
  [1.45]  [0.50] 
Priming × Financial literacy  0.0969*  0.108* 
  [1.86]  [1.93] 
Financial distress    -0.0731*** -0.0751*** 
   [-2.99] [-2.96] 
Priming × Financial distress   -0.00260 0.0210 
   [-0.08] [0.62] 
Constant 1.141*** 1.147*** 1.109*** 1.113*** 
 [16.82] [16.73] [15.62] [15.67] 
Observations 688 688 688 688 
R2 0.12 0.14 0.15 0.17 
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Figure 1. Baseline results: predicted values of Extreme negative attitudes and Extreme positive attitudes 
The figure shows the predicted values of Extreme negative attitudes from specification 3 of Table 6 (left hand side) and the equivalent of Extreme 
positive attitudes from specification 4 of Table 6 (right hand side) depending on whether respondents are below or above the poverty line (x-axis) 







Poverty, salience of financial vulnerability and attitude toward 
financial advice seeking: a survey-experiment 
 
This appendix, intended for internet use only, reports the following: 
1. The 24 questions that include the five questions addressing the attitude toward the bank 
advisor (questions 3, 15, 16, 17 and 18)  
2. The test that treatment and control groups are homogeneous as regards the observable 
characteristics in the three subsamples reflecting terciles of the distribution of Income. 
3. The results from sensitivity tests on the use of demographic control variables. 




Section A1: The 24 questions  
We report here the 24 questions that follow the priming questions for the treatment group and are 
followed by the priming questions for the control group. The order of the questions appears as in 
the actual survey (headers are not included in the questionnaire). 
 
Self-confidence in money management (six questions) 
Overall, would say that you are comfortable in doing calculations? (question 1) 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is “not at all” and 5 is “yes, exactly”, assess whether your financial 
knowledge is sufficient to deal with each of the following situations.  
2. Assess the return and the risk associated with financial investments. (question 2) 
3. Discuss with your financial advisor to optimize your financial management. (question 3) 
4. Read your account statement. (question 4) 
5. Subscribe a credit. (question 5) 
6. Buy a house. (question 6) 
 
Financial literacy quiz (six questions) 
1. Suppose you put $100 into a savings account with a guaranteed interest rate of 2% per year. 
You don’t make any further payments into this account and you don’t withdraw any money. How 
much would be in the account at the end of the first year? [Open response: $102] (question 7) 
 
2. and how much would be in the account at the end of five years? (question 8) 
 Would it be; 
a) More than €110* 
b) Exactly €110 
c) Less than €110 
d) It is impossible to tell from the information given 
e) other response (open) 




3. You owe $3,000 on your credit card. You pay a minimum payment of $30 each month. At an 
Annual Percentage Rate of 12% (or 1% per month), how many years would it take to eliminate 
your credit card debt if you made no additional new charges? (question 9) 
a) Less than 5 years 
b) Between 5 and 10 years 
c) Between 10 and 15 years 
d) Never, you will continue to be in debt* 
e) Do not know 
  
4. An investment with a high return is likely to be high risk. [True/False] (question 10) 
5. It is usually possible to reduce the risk of investing in the stock market by buying a wide range 
of stocks and shares. [True/False] (question 11) 
6. High inflation means that the cost of living is increasing slowly. [True/False] (question 12) 
 
Cognitive reflection test (CRT) 
A bat and a ball cost €1.10 in total. The bat costs €1 more than the ball. How much does the ball 
cost? [5cts] (question 13) 
 
Loss aversion 
Let’s imagine that you are endowed with 10€, would you accept to participate in the following 
lottery (question 14):  
1. Earning 10€ more if the coin shows head, and losing 10€ if it shows tail? (Yes/No); 
2. If respondents answered no: would you accept to participate if the loss pass to 8€? (Yes/No) 
3. If respondents answered no: would you accept to participate if the loss pass to 5€? (Yes/No) 
4. If respondents answered no: for which amount of money would you accept to participate? (open 
response)  
 
Perception of the bank advisor (four questions) 
Would you say that you “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly 
disagree” with the following statements? 
1. I worry that the bank advisor would think I’m ignorant if I come into their office with a minor 
financial concern. (question 15) 
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2. Describing to my bank advisor how I spend money on frivolous or unnecessary items is not 
embarrassing for me. (question 16) 
3. The bank advisor is the right person to talk about financial distress. (question 17) 
4. When I have to take an important decision, I do not hesitate to take some advice from my bank 
officer. (question 18) 
 
Negative emotions about the financial situation (three questions) 
Would you say that you “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly 
disagree” with the following statements? 
1. Thinking about my personal finance makes me anxious. (question 19) 
2. I can feel guilty by thinking that I should have better controlled my spending. (question 20) 
3. When I have financial problems I prefer not evoking them with anyone, not even my relatives. 
(question 21) 
 
Budget behavioral intentions (three questions) 
Would you say that you “strongly agree”, “somewhat agree”, “somewhat disagree”, or “strongly 
disagree” with the following statements? 
4. When I subscribe a loan, I usually choose to repay the highest monthly settlements, even though 
it requires an important budget effort. (question 22) 
5. I would accept to implement a standing orders toward a blocked savings account that would 
constraint me to save more (question 23) 
I take measures to save energy in order to improve my budget situation (question 24) 
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Table A1. Randomization checks on demographics conditional to Below poverty line 
The table reports the results from t-tests (p-value) of the difference in means and the normalized difference of the demographic variables 
across treatment statuses, for poor respondents (Below pov line =1) and nonpoor respondents (Below pov line =0). All variables are defined 
in Table 2. t-tests and normalized differences are not reported when the mean of the variable is 0 across treatment statuses. 






















Age 50.47 49.78 0.62 0.03  39.76 40.13 0.87 -0.02 
Woman 0.48 0.46 0.72 0.02  0.60 0.57 0.76 0.03 
Low education 0.27 0.27 0.99 0.00  0.39 0.40 0.91 -0.01 
Intermediate education 0.20 0.16 0.23 0.07  0.21 0.16 0.36 0.10 
High education 0.53 0.57 0.35 -0.06  0.37 0.44 0.37 -0.10 
Don’t know (Education) 0.00 0.00 . .  0.02 0.00 0.19 0.15 
Agriculteur 0.02 0.01 0.38 0.05  0.01 0.06 0.07 -0.19 
Artisan, merchant, company 
director 0.03 0.03 0.97 0.00 
 
0.03 0.06 0.36 -0.10 
Inactive 0.03 0.03 0.79 -0.02  0.16 0.22 0.31 -0.11 
Executive or intellectual 
profession 0.12 0.14 0.35 -0.06 
 
0.04 0.02 0.51 0.07 
Student 0.01 0.03 0.13 -0.10  0.12 0.12 0.92 -0.01 
Employee 0.13 0.15 0.63 -0.03  0.28 0.21 0.29 0.11 
Factory worker 0.14 0.10 0.15 0.09  0.15 0.15 0.96 0.01 
Intermediate profession 0.16 0.17 0.71 -0.02  0.07 0.09 0.79 -0.03 
Retiree 0.37 0.34 0.54 0.04  0.14 0.07 0.17 0.15 
Ile de France 0.18 0.20 0.56 -0.04  0.15 0.18 0.55 -0.06 
North 0.05 0.07 0.31 -0.06  0.09 0.04 0.19 0.14 
Est 0.09 0.07 0.58 0.03  0.05 0.11 0.17 -0.15 
East of Parisian Basin 0.07 0.09 0.37 -0.06  0.07 0.06 0.72 0.04 
West of Parisian Basin 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.12  0.06 0.12 0.18 -0.14 
West 0.14 0.12 0.44 0.05  0.17 0.15 0.67 0.05 
South-West 0.11 0.11 0.97 0.00  0.17 0.05 0.01 0.28 
South-East 0.12 0.15 0.20 -0.08  0.12 0.11 0.88 0.02 
Mediterranea 0.13 0.12 0.62 0.03  0.12 0.18 0.22 -0.13 
Single 0.21 0.24 0.51 -0.04  0.43 0.38 0.52 0.07 
Divorced 0.05 0.08 0.10 -0.10  0.09 0.07 0.77 0.03 
Married or civil union 0.68 0.64 0.32 0.06  0.41 0.46 0.52 -0.07 
Separated 0.00 0.02 0.13 -0.10  0.03 0.09 0.13 -0.16 
Widow(er) 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.11  0.04 0.00 0.06 0.21 
House owner (with mortgage) 0.22 0.24 0.75 -0.02  0.13 0.11 0.72 0.04 
House owner (no mortgage) 0.47 0.48 0.87 -0.01  0.19 0.22 0.65 -0.05 
Hosted 0.03 0.06 0.14 -0.09  0.15 0.04 0.01 0.28 
Tenant 0.21 0.19 0.59 0.03  0.35 0.40 0.49 -0.07 
Tenant (Low cost housing) 0.05 0.04 0.48 0.04  0.15 0.20 0.42 -0.09 
Other (dwelling) 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.09  0.02 0.04 0.54 -0.06 




Table A2. Sensitivity to demographic variables 
This table reports coefficient estimates and standard errors (in brackets) for specifications that differ based on the control variables. Estimation method is OLS with robust 
standards errors (clustered by individual). Dependent variable is Nonextreme attitudes. Income and all demographic variables are mean centered for easier interpretation of 
the intercept and main term of Priming. All variables are defined in Table 2. The lower part of the table reports the number of observations (N) and the R-squared. The *, 
**, and *** marks denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 

















Priming -0.0742 -0.0790 -0.0752 -0.0835 -0.0978 -0.0987 -0.102 -0.0661 
 [-0.59] [-0.64] [-0.60] [-0.67] [-0.80] [-0.79] [-0.82] [-0.53] 
Below poverty line -0.293 -0.366* -0.286 -0.293 -0.277 -0.291 -0.349* -0.320* 
 [-1.54] [-1.91] [-1.50] [-1.53] [-1.38] [-1.56] [-1.81] [-1.65] 
Priming × Below poverty line 0.830*** 0.837*** 0.829*** 0.842*** 0.896*** 0.857*** 0.831*** 0.817*** 
 [3.27] [3.28] [3.26] [3.31] [3.49] [3.39] [3.26] [3.17] 
Age  -0.00685**       
  [-2.04]       
Woman   -0.0581      
   [-0.53]      
Low education    -0.0966     
    [-0.74]     
Intermediate education    -0.224     
    [-1.48]     
I don’t know (education)    0.684     
    [0.63]     
Agriculteur     -0.303    
     [-0.66]    
Artisan, merchant, firm director     -0.0296    
     [-0.10]    
Inactive     -0.358    
     [-1.38]    
Executive, intellectual prof.     0.0963    
     [0.52]    
Student     0.508*    
     [1.88]    
Employee     0.164    
     [0.96]    
Factory worker     -0.0470    
     [-0.23]    
Intermediate profession     0.514***    
     [3.05]    
Ile de France      0.145   
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      [0.75]   
North      0.280   
      [0.97]   
Est      0.303   
      [1.33]   
East of Parisian Basin      0.0288   
      [0.11]   
West of Parisian Basin      -0.0203   
      [-0.09]   
West      -0.137   
      [-0.65]   
South-West      0.0848   
      [0.40]   
South-East      0.387*   
      [1.88]   
Single       0.374  
       [1.12]  
Divorced       0.528  
       [1.42]  
Married or civil union       0.245  
       [0.76]  
Separated       0.729*  
       [1.68]  
House owner (with mortgage)        0.507*** 
        [3.57] 
Hosted        -0.117 
        [-0.44] 
Tenant        0.380** 
        [2.57] 
Tenant (low cost housing)        0.0919 
        [0.41] 
Other (dwelling)        0.201 
        [0.47] 
Don’t know (dwelling)        2.480*** 
        [12.81] 
Constant 3.037*** 3.058*** 3.036*** 3.041*** 3.038*** 3.046*** 3.066*** 3.042*** 
 [34.46] [34.89] [34.52] [34.40] [34.56] [34.58] [34.84] [34.94] 
Observations 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 688 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 
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Table A3. Correlation matrix 
The table shows the pairwise correlation coefficients between the variable of interest used in this study. The * mark indicates 
statistical significance at the 5% level. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
(1) Positive attitudes 1.000         
(2) Nonextreme attitudes -0.021 1.000        
(3) Extreme negative attitudes -0.646* -0.694* 1.000       
(4) Extreme positive attitudes 0.691* -0.675* -0.064* 1.000      
(5) Nonextreme other attitudes -0.058 0.516* -0.324* -0.383* 1.000     
(6) Priming 0.038 0.022 -0.037 0.007 0.025 1.000    
(7) Below poverty line -0.138* 0.030 0.082* -0.133* 0.001 -0.055 1.000   
(8) Financial literacy 0.164* -0.040 -0.087* 0.144* -0.128* 0.040 -0.242* 1.000  
(9) Financial distress -0.230* 0.110* 0.100* -0.266* 0.099* 0.027 0.268* -0.392* 1.000 
 
 
